The North Korean succession (part 2)

Playing the China card

If this is true, North Korea’s neighbours should brace themselves
for a rough ride. The omens for a seamless transition are
not good. Since last year the regime has imposed, then swiftly
abandoned, draconian currency reforms. The torpedoing of a
South Korean naval vessel in March, which the Seoul government
blamed on the Pyongyang regime, caused an international
outcry that led to further e orts to isolate it economically.
Earlier this month the party conference was mysteriously
postponed for a few weeks. Behind these events some detect a
power struggle between or within the party and the army that
has been going on ever since Kim senior su ered a suspected
stroke in 2008. If this ever turned into open hostilities, the consequences
could be devastating��which is why, however
much outside powers want regime change in North Korea,
they are right to fear civil war still more.
Acollapse in North Korea could leave South Korea and China,
its immediate neighbours, facing a refugee crisis. The entire
region’s economic boom could be thrown o course. There is
even a risk that China and America would nd themselves
supporting opposing sides in a con ict that could involve nuclear
weapons. Against that risk, the appointment of a clueless
dauphin as the next leader might not be so bad, if his membership
of the Kim clan enabled him to hold the country together.
He may anyway be put under the stewardship of his powerful
uncle, Chang Sung Taek, to ensure continuity. But if such a transition
is to do anything for the region’s long-term health, the
outside world needs to rethink its approach.
Awkwardly for the West, China has the greatest leverage,
thanks to its unseemly haste to invest in North Korea’s mines
and ports. But China seldom uses it. On the older Kim’s two
train trips to China this year, it pointedly refused to criticise the
regime over the sinking of the South Korean ship. The Chinese
put stability above all else, which gives Pyongyang an excuse
to maintain the repressive status quo. That could prove dangerously
short-sighted if the in exible regime ever snaps.
Other countries, including South Korea, America, Russia
and Japan, must also prepare for the worst. But they might also
consider the possibility that a young Kim would be more open
to reform. They could again promise cash in exchange for
meaningful nuclear disarmament, and make every e ort to
engage him. It would be based only on a tiny hope, because it
would take a miracle for the son to step out of the father’s shadow.
But if he does not, North Korea is ultimately doomed. And
the grandson of the Great Leader and son of the Dear Leader
would deserve nothing but a woeful sobriquet: Dear God.